Abstract

What is the nature of substantive representation within American institutions of government, and to what extent do constituents’ preferences turn into adopted policy? To answer these questions, I analyze data on federal policies proposed between 1964 and 2006 and constituents’ support for them by running a series of linear probability models to estimate the chance of policy adoption as a function of constituent support. I find the president is more responsive to constituents than Congress, and high-income constituents’ preferences – but not those of median- and low-income constituents – are significantly correlated with policies adopted by both Congress and the president.

Keywords: Democracy, Representation, Income Inequality, Linear Probability Models, USA

How to Cite:

Siegel, N., (2022) “From Preference to Policy: Wealth, Institutions of Government, and the Search for Democracy”, UCL Journal of Economics 1(1), 150–167. doi: https://doi.org/10.14324/111.444.2755-0877.1408